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In this paper, I will look at the relationship between Weitz’s claim that art is an “open” concept 
and Dickie’s institutional theory of art, in its most recent form. Dickie’s theory has been 
extensively discussed, and often criticized, in the literature on aesthetics, yet it has rarely been 
observed – to my knowledge at least – that the fact that his theory actually incorporates, at least 
to some extent, Weitz’s claim about the “openness” of the concept of art, precisely accounts for 
what I take to be the main flaws in the theory. In what follows I present arguments for that claim, 
looking briefly at the position of both authors with respect to the concept of art, then showing 
how they relate to each other, and what implications this has for Dickie’s institutional theory, 
and more generally for the traditional project of characterising art. 
Let me begin with a brief reminder of Weitz’s argument against definitions of art, as it 
appears in his famous essay “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics” (Weitz, 1956). It is a 
well-known fact that a great number of philosophers, since the time of Plato up to our own day, 
have attempted to give a “correct” enunciation of the nature of art. They have notably 
maintained that art consists for example in “significant form” (Bell and Fry’s Formalism), or in 
the communication of emotion through some sensuous public medium (Emotionalism), or in 
the clarification and externalization of a certain kind of “intuition” (Croce’s and Collingwood’s 
Intuitionism), to give but a few examples. Yet Weitz thought that such attempts at capturing the 
nature of art were all fundamentally flawed. First of all, it seems that one can always find a 
counterexample to any such proposed definition of art. But furthermore, Weitz said, such 
definitions simply cannot but fail to achieve their aim, because of the very nature of the concept 
of art. “Art”, he argued, is an open concept – that is, it is possible to extend its meaning in 
unpredictable and even unimaginable ways, in order to apply it to new entities that were not 
formerly included under that concept. For that reason, no set of necessary and sufficient 
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conditions for something to count as art can be provided. And to explain how it is that we apply 
the concept of art to various human productions, Weitz appealed to Wittgenstein’s example of 
the word “game” in a famous passage of the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
aphorisms 65-69). According to Wittgenstein, there is no feature common to all games that 
would constitute the basis for our calling them all “games”; if we do this, it is because of the 
family resemblances that unite them. Game X does not resemble game Z, but it resembles game 
Y, which itself resembles Z.1 Weitz thought that the concept of art functioned in a similar 
manner: we apply it to all the different artworks not because there would be a certain set of 
features common to them all, but because we can detect certain family resemblances between 
them. For instance, work A resembles work B in its ability to produce aesthetic pleasure in the 
viewer, and work C in the way it challenges the artistic conventions that prevailed in its time, 
but work B does not really resemble work C. 
On that basis, Weitz concluded that all attempts at defining art were unavoidably doomed to 
failure, since novel conditions (the production of something revolutionary) could always arise 
that would lead to an evolution in the meaning of “art”. And importantly, this evolution would 
be, according to Weitz, the product of a decision on our part to extend the concept (Weitz, 1956, 
188). According to Weitz, this “openness” of the concept of art is the condition of the 
possibility of further creativity and innovation in the artistic field: 
 
[T]he very expansive, adventurous character of art, its ever-present changes and novel creations, makes it 
logically impossible to ensure any set of defining properties.  
(Ibid., 189) 
 
As we know, Weitz’s challenge to the project of defining art elicited a number of reactions 
on the part of philosophers, many of whom proposed to meet the challenge. Such reactions 
owed much to Maurice Mandelbaum’s famous essay written in 1965, ‘Family Resemblances 
and Generalization Concerning the Arts’, in which he argued that Weitz’s argument did not 
demonstrate the impossibility of finding a “non-exhibited” property common to all artworks, 
and thus did not manage to discredit the project of producing a definition. Prominent among 
these reactions against Weitz’s position was George Dickie’s institutional theory of art. In its 
latest formulation (from 1984 onwards), Dickie’s theory revolves around a set of five 
definitions, those of “artist”, “artwork”, “public”, “artworld” and “artworld system”. I will 
assume here that we all have at least a rough idea of what the “artworld” is: it encompasses both 
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  What exactly Wittgenstein himself was trying to achieve with the idea of family resemblances is a debated 
issue, about which a vast literature exists; let me make it clear that I am concerned here, rather, with what Weitz did 
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the artists and their public – the people who go to concerts and art galleries, the museum 
curators, the art critics, etc. I will thus content myself with giving Dickie’s definition of an 
artwork (in its final version): 
 
A work of art is an artifact of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public.  
(Dickie, 1984, 80) 
 
Now while it is true that Dickie’s theory originally arose in reaction and in opposition to 
Weitz’s arguments, it nevertheless remains true, as Robert Yanal has accurately pointed out 
(Yanal, 1998, 2-3), that Dickie’s theory incorporates to some extent Weitz’s idea that “art” is an 
open concept. In his most recently published book, Dickie thus writes that 
 
the artworld is a cultural construction – something that members of society have collectively made into 
what it is over time. Although perhaps no one has ever consciously decided that dog shows are excluded 
from the cultural construction that is the artworld, it has turned out that way. If the history of culture had 
been a little different, the artworld might also be different and include dog shows”  
(Dickie, 2001, 60; my emphasis). 
 
Although such distinctions may not have been instituted out of a conscious decision, Dickie still 
implies that a “decision” of some kind has been made by our culture to keep dog shows out of 
the artworld, and on this point he appears to agree with Weitz. As we have seen, Weitz thought 
that the concept of art evolved according to the decisions regularly made by representatives of 
the artworld (typically art critics) to extend its meaning to cover new entities. Now I wish to 
stave off two criticisms that might be made against Weitz here. First, Weitz did not think that 
such representatives could make their decisions in a purely arbitrary manner – indeed, had he 
thought so, he would have had no need for a theory of family resemblances to explain why we 
call certain things art and others not. According to Weitz, when, for example, we ask whether a 
new literary work of an innovative and disconcerting kind deserves to be called a “novel”, what 
is at stake is “a decision as to whether the work under examination is similar in certain respects 
to other works, already called “novels”, and consequently warrants the extension of the concept 
to cover the new case” (Weitz, 1956, 188; my emphasis). Secondly, it is also illegitimate to 
claim, as a number of authors have done (see for example Dickie, 1984, 33, and 2001, 14; or 
Carroll, 1999, 222-24), that Weitz’s position was incompatible with the specification of 
relevant similarities as acceptable criteria of “arthood”, as opposed to “similarities” broadly 
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understood, and therefore had the undesirable implication of drawing everything into the realm 
of art, since everything resembles everything else in some respect or other. Weitz clearly was 
not opposed to the idea of declaring certain kinds of similarities relevant by contrast with others, 
since he acknowledged that “[a]estheticians may lay down similarity conditions” (Weitz, 1956, 
189). 
I think that Dickie’s integration of Weitz’s intuition about the “openness” of the concept of 
art partly works in favour of his theory. Indeed, it does not appear unreasonable to imagine that, 
instead of eventually recognizing Duchamp’s readymades, and all the later works inspired by 
them, as works of art, we might have forged a new concept – other than “art” – under which to 
include them. For instance we might have chosen to reserve the term “artwork” for creations 
being at least of the kind that tends to produce an aesthetic experience in the viewer (or the 
listener, or the reader), and to talk of Duchamp’s readymades as being, say, “intellectual jokes” 
rather than art2 – despite the similarities we can discern between them and “artworks” in the 
strict sense just sketched; indeed, a work like Fountain has been created by someone who 
clearly was an artist (as his early works, at least, testify to), it is displayed in art galleries, and so 
on. These similarities provide reasons for considering Fountain a work of art, yet they do not 
compel us to do so: the specification just proposed for the concept of "art", however 
controversial it may appear, nevertheless does not seem obviously illegitimate. Both Dickie and 
Weitz take such elements into account. 
Now it has to be acknowledged that Weitz’s view of what the “decision-makers” could be 
led to count as art was rather permissive, even though their decisions were supposed to be 
motivated by an appeal to observed – relevant – similarities with pre-existing artworks. For 
instance, Weitz thought that an art critic who observed a piece of driftwood in its natural state, 
untouched by any human hand, and exclaimed, “this piece of driftwood is a lovely piece of 
sculpture”, was thereby extending the concept of art beyond the realm of artifacts (Ibid., 190). 
Now I want to argue here that Dickie’s theory actually follows Weitz so far as to become flawed 
by a lack of sufficient normative power. True, Dickie is not as permissive as Weitz. Through the 
requirement of artifactuality, his definition forbids that something which is not an human 
creation, like a piece of driftwood in its natural environment, may nevertheless be a work of art 
in the literal sense of the term. And certainly Weitz was wrong to claim that we could call such 
a piece of driftwood “art” more than metaphorically (in an honorific sense, as when we praise 
someone else’s culinary talent by saying: “your cake is a work of art”). I think we cannot but 
                                               
2
  This is precisely what someone like Monroe C. Beardsley would have had us do: see Beardsley, 1983, 60. 
Alexandre Erler 
 114 
agree with Dickie when he writes in The Art Circle that “not everything created by an artist […] 
is necessarily a work of art […]. Similarly, just because something is treated as a thing of a 
certain type (art) by someone (art critics) does not necessarily mean that something is a thing of 
that kind” (Dickie, 1984, 60). 
However, Dickie’s definition of art does not appear to provide sufficient safeguards against 
the danger he himself points out: it still seems to give too much power to the artworld regarding 
the determination of what is and what is not art. For consider what would happen if, for example, 
the Western artworld fell into a state of profound decadence, and it became an established view 
that Jerry Springer’s talk shows, and similar TV programmes, were works of art. (Not that I 
necessarily think this likely to happen – and fortunately so – yet the example remains 
enlightening.) It seems that Dickie’s definition would then sanction that view: Jerry Springer’s 
shows are presumably artefacts in Dickie’s sense (for Dickie an “artefact” is not necessarily a 
physical object; it rather means “human creation”), and in the hypothetical context I propose to 
imagine, they would be artefacts of a kind created to be presented to an artworld public. Jerry 
Springer would indeed have the satisfaction of thinking of himself as an artist, since the 
artworld would grant him that status, and he would intend his shows for presentation to 
members of the artworld (which in that case would have come to encompass the viewers of talk 
shows). Yet certainly we feel that Jerry Springer’s shows are not art – and that they would not 
be art even if the majority of the artworld declared them to be such; or if we accepted to call 
them art in order to comply with the general practice, we would still feel that the term “art” had 
been somewhat emptied of its meaning. Jerry Springer’s shows are pure entertainment, and art 
is something different from entertainment. But Dickie’s definition of art fails to take that 
feeling into account. It thus appears, to some extent, to be a sociological account of “art”, 
telling us at most what our society dominantly considers to be art, rather than a statement of 
what art actually is, no matter what the prevailing view may be about it in the artworld. It is true 
that, for the reasons Weitz has given, the issue of what art is cannot be completely separated 
from the question of what the artworld calls art. But I hope to have shown that these two issues 
should not be simply identified with one another. A good theory of art, while acknowledging 
that the concept of art evolves on the basis of decisions made by representatives of the artworld, 
should nevertheless state that such decisions need to have grounds that square with our 
fundamental intuitions about art (for example, that artworks have to be creations of some sort; 
that they must at least have a potential value of some particular kind; etc.), and that it is not 
enough that the people who make such decisions believe they have good grounds for them – in 
my example, the admirers of Jerry Springer might argue that his shows have a deep emotional 
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impact on the viewers, that they involve a confessional aspect similar to the works of Tracey 
Emin, and so on – and they might take these reasons to warrant the inclusion of talk shows 
among artworks. Dickie’s theory only partially fulfils that normative requirement. 
Moreover, even if we assume that my example has no plausibility and that Dickie’s 
definition is unlikely to ever actually imply that talk shows are works of art, it remains correct 
to claim that it would have that implication if the artworld decided to regard them that way; and 
this, I think, is enough to show the insufficient normative power of Dickie’s definition, which 
only contingently matches certain important intuitions we have about art. Of course one could 
argue in favour of a more permissive view of art than the one I am advocating here; some might 
even go so far as to agree with Ben Vauthier that “everything is art and art is life”.3 My point, 
however, is that Dickie’s definition, on his own account, is not meant to accommodate such 
permissiveness (which would indeed make the concept of art completely empty), but that it still 
follows Weitz too far in this respect.  
Finally, it is an often-made complaint that Dickie’s theory is uninformative because of the 
circularity of its definitions: “artwork” is defined by reference to the notion of “artworld public”, 
yet “artworld” is in turn defined in terms of “artworld system”, the definition of which itself 
refers to the notion of artwork, artist, and artworld public (cf. Stecker, 2003, 148; and Levinson, 
1987, 145). I would like to endorse here the charge of uninformativeness, but also to suggest 
that this defect is, again, partly due to Dickie’s affinities with the open-concept position. It 
seems indeed that Dickie’s definition fails to bring out the specific features that make artworks 
what they are. He insists that his theory stresses the importance of the institutional framework 
against which works of art are created (Dickie, 2001, 64). But this can only convince us if we 
accept Dickie’s point that for something to be “an artefact of a kind created…”, i.e. a work of art, 
is for it to have been intended by its maker to be suitable for presentation to an artworld public. 
And this point seems to be undermined by the possibility of “ingenuous art”, illustrated both by 
fictional examples (e.g. the member of a primitive society with no concept of art who creates 
the representation of a leopard and manages to endow it with something of the fearsomeness of 
the animal; see Stecker, 1986, 211) and concrete ones (e.g. works like the Venus of Willendorf). 
But from the moment we reject the idea that an “artistic” intention is necessary for creating art, 
it appears that while the institutional framework emphasized by Dickie may be crucial to the 
“arthood” of some contemporary works like Duchamp’s readymades, it is not so for those of a 
more traditional kind, like figurative paintings and sculptures. To explain why we call the latter 
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  Quoted in Osborne, 1980, 11. 
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type of works art, it seems that we will unavoidably have to refer to the particular intrinsic 
features that make them such, and which, as Noël Carroll suggests, allow them to perform some 
acknowledged function of art (Carroll, 1999, 248). And in this respect, Dickie’s definition tells 
us nothing at all – not surprisingly, since it is not meant to make any reference whatsoever to the 
intrinsic properties of artworks. In the end, Dickie’s definition neither provides a satisfactory 
explanation of why we call certain things “art” and others not, nor a sound criterion for 
distinguishing between art and non-art in controversial cases (due to its excessive 
inclusiveness). Precisely because of its commitment to accommodating the “openness” of the 
concept of art and the incredible heterogeneity within the realm of artworks, Dickie’s definition 
thus fails to perform what I guess we would expect from a good – purely classificatory – 
definition of art; so that this commitment would seem to be its undoing. 
I think that there are two main lessons to draw from these considerations. The first one 
concerns the project of providing an essential definition of art. I shall not conclude with Weitz 
that such a project is necessarily doomed to failure. As Stephen Davies and Noël Carroll, 
among others, have convincingly argued, we cannot be certain that such a definitional project is 
bound to fail even if we acknowledge that our understanding of art is open to change (see 
Davies, 1991, 12ff, and Carroll, 220-21). However, it remains that the failure of Dickie’s 
institutional definition, which is certainly one of the most plausible candidates for carrying out 
the traditional project of Aesthetics in the contemporary era, can legitimately make us sceptical 
about the possibility of giving a substantial definition of art that would at the same time take 
into account contemporary artworks in all their variety. The second lesson is that whether one 
decides nevertheless to carry on with the project of finding an essential definition, or whether 
one prefers to abandon it in favour of a solution closer to Noël Carroll’s theory of historical 
narratives, one should take into account, for the reasons given above, Weitz’s sound intuition 
about the open character of the concept of art. But on the other hand, the problems we have 
pointed out about Dickie’s definition of art also show that one should not follow Weitz in his 
tendency to bestow a degree of quasi-godlike power upon the artworld; room should be left for 
the possibility that the artworld as a whole may be mistaken in some of its views about art.4
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